The Assault of the Hindenburg Line

It was intended that two Divisions of U.S.A. troops should attack and capture the Hindenburg Line at certain points, between Le Catelet and Bellicourt, where the Somme-Escaut Canal runs underground through a tunnel.

Whilst this operation was being performed under the protection of a barrage, two Australian Divisions, namely, the 3rd and the 5th, were to leapfrog through the Americans and carry on the advance. At 8 o'clock on the night of September 27th, we moved out from Doingt. Owing to the great congestion of traffic our progress was slow, and this was accentuated by intense darkness. Our bivouac in consequence was not reached until midnight.

The route taken was along the Peronne-Roisel Road to Roisel, thence to Beau Lecois, and onwards in an easterly direction. We found the area to be absolutely devoid of shelter of any description. The weather was cold and frosty, in consequence of which we spent a cold uncomfortable night and did not sleep particularly well.

The next day we took advantage of the shelter afforded by a huge shell-crater. Whilst waiting there enemy artillery became very active, and hostile aircraft paid us assiduous attention by dropping bombs in our neighbourhood.

NON-SUCCESS OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS

On September 29th at 5.40 a.m. two Divisions of American troops attacked the Hindenburg Line between Bellicourt and Bony. A heavy artillery barrage was provided for them, but unfortunately they lost direction, and worse than that, neglected to "mop-up" the defences of the enemy over which they passed.

The attack was unsuccessful and the objectives were not reached. Owing to this failure, Australian troops which should have been engaged in exploiting the expected success, were unable to reach even their jumping-off line Instead, they were hastily sent forward to force the Hindenburg Line, which as stated before, should have been already accomplished.

Our zero time was 6.45 a.m. The barrage was an exceedingly good one. At this time our observation balloons moved forward 3,000 yards. We advanced in column, with fifty yards interval between platoons and later went on in artillery formation. We had only with us A, B, and D. Companies, our C Company having been split up into working parties and other details.

Besides heavy shelling and machine-gun fire, which was expected, we encountered a strong concentration of tear-gas, which however, cleared off within an hour.

When the leading Battalions of the Brigade topped the ridge, they discovered themselves to be in the midst of heavy machine-gun fire from the direction of Gillemont Farm and Malakoff Wood. Field guns were also firing from the support line of the Hindenburg Line.

The severe losses sustained by the American troops were due, partly to their inexperience, but mainly to the fact that in their excitement and enthusiasm, they had rushed forward impetuously, and had passed by the enemy's hiding places. After the Americans had got well forward, the enemy emerged from concealment and shot at the Yanks from the rear.

Australians had long ago learnt their lesson, and never failed to perform the operation called "mopping-up." Had the Americans attended to this most important factor, they would have saved themselves and the Australian troops, the loss of many valuable lives.

THE FORTY-SECOND ENTERS THE HINDENBURG LINE

We had to make good the incomplete work of the Yanks by resorting to the difficult and arduous process of bombing out every likely harbouring place. Through this, the advance of the 11th Brigade to the Hindenburg Line was held up until 3.30 p.m.

Although shelling by the enemy was not heavy at this juncture, it was consistent, and caused us many casualties. A large number of our tanks were put out of action by anti-tank weapons, and so at least were two of our armoured cars which got as far as Bony.

So far as war in the air was concerned, we had absolute mastery. At 4.45 p.m. our companies moved off and again encountered heavy shellfire as they took up positions near some cross roads. Our B Company proceeded to "mop-up" Malakoff Wood and cleared it of the foe, but fire from enemy machine-guns and shell fire rendered the place a very "hot shop!'

Our A Company went through B Company and entered the Hindenburg Line. One platoon proceeded to "mop-up" the front line from south to north, with another platoon in close support, whilst yet another platoon was operating, in a similar manner in the support line We were throwing away no chances.

Immediately upon our approach, enemy troops bolted down into tunnels, and were dealt with. Our A Company continued to work northwards along the Hindenburg Line until they had passed the forward elements of the 44th Battalion about 300 yards north of the locality called Todd Lane.

Meanwhile B Company had taken up a position m Quinnemont Pit Lane from Malakoff Wood to Paul Farm. D Company was in reserve, for several hours after dark under some low banks, and they were experiencing a pretty miserable existence. Besides numberless machinegun bullets flying around unceasingly, storms of heavy rain made matters still more uncomfortable. Eventually D Company was withdrawn to a trench which gave some slight measure of shelter.

All this time shelling in this area was heavy and consistent. The enemy placed his machine-guns in cleverly concealed positions, within extremely short range and made determined attempts to push us back by vigorously attacking with bombs.

We hung on with grim determination, but the thinness of our ranks, the weather conditions, and the lack of hot food, all conspired to make the task one of extreme difficulty. Still we persevered, and held the position until next day, September 30th, in spite of many untoward incidents. The splendid work of the runners might here be mentioned. It was a task, intricate and hazardous in the extreme for them to negotiate the immense masses of barbed wire entanglements which spread in all directions, and the enshrouding darkness rendered the surroundings an almost impenetrable maze. Under such circumstances, it was not to be wondered that messages should have been slightly delayed.

At one time there was a most unsatisfactory congestion of troops. It happened when the trenches were packed with Americans and 42nd men. On the arrival of the 43rd, 33rd, and 35th Battalions, in the vicinity of Top Lane to Malakoff Wood Gully, there was such a dense accumulation of troops that it was decided the 35th Battalion should withdraw until such time as the front line troops advanced and made room for the others.

Throughout the day our A Company was in touch with the enemy. Bombing encounters took place continuously though no appreciable amount of ground was gained. Their trenches were commanded by at least six enemy machine-guns, one of which could not be located, although it was only fifty yards away. It was very skilfully hidden in a mass of barbed wire, but subsequently it was brilliantly knocked out by one of A Company's N.C.O.'s.

Tanks at this time were still unsuccessful. Several were put out of action by shellfire from the direction of Bony. The others were withdrawn.

It appears that our A Company was responsible for most of the activity against the enemy on this day, September 30th, and it was seen to that they were kept well supplied with ammunition and bombs. At 6 p.m. we were' ordered to "hold fast," and pinpoint the line in anticipation of the taking of the tunnel by the 9th and 10th Brigades.

At midnight orders were received to relieve the 44th Battalion which we started to do forthwith, but the operation was rendered exceedingly difficult on account of the intense darkness, rain, and the slippery state of the ground. Thick uncut wire entanglements were encountered in all directions, so that we were not able to carry out the completion of the relief until 4 a.m. on October 1st. Although we were utterly weary and out of sorts there still existed the will and determination to clean up the position which at that time was far from satisfactory.

We eventually took up positions as follows: -D Company in the front line, B Company along the Canal Tunnel, commanding the entrance, with A Company in support. D Company was in touch with the 5th Australian Division on the right and with the 43rd Battalion on the left. Among our captures were a high velocity 10 centimetre gun, 4 '77 guns, and about 150 machine-guns.

The 10th Brigade made good progress in the Tunnel, and at 6 p.m. their line extended to The Knob, Bony Point.

The 33rd Battalion, which was attached to the 11th Brigade, pushed through us and held on from Bony Point

From daylight till evening Battalion Intelligence Section did splendid observation work, and reported many good targets for the direction of our fire.

Communication to companies was maintained by lamp and runner to Command Post, thence touch was preserved direct to Headquarters and Brigade by lamp and wire, and by wire to both Battalions on our flanks.

At noon, Battalion Headquarters were established at Command Post. The difficult and arduous task of keeping the men well supplied with hot meals was carried out by the Battalion Transport, which brought the meals up to the front line on pack mules, and though at times they were very much delayed, which caused us to grouse and grumble, it was realised, later on, how well and capably the transport had carried out its duties.

At 11 o'clock p.m. D Company was advised that the enemy was thought to be clearing out from Le Catelet. Patrols were immediately sent out to get in touch with the enemy. Machine-gun fire was encountered from the direction of Le Catelet and Guoy, whilst salvoes of shells came over from an easterly direction.

The next day, October 2nd, found us still "hanging on" and carrying out some very active patrolling work. The night had been clear and starry, but intensely cold. Though we were quite unaware of the fact, this was positively our last night of actual warfare.

Eventually we were relieved by the King's Royal Rifles. They had a trench strength of four Companies of 100 men, whilst all that remained of the 42nd, to be relieved, were three companies of but small numerical strength.

D Company had pushed out a platoon to garrison Le Catelet which was duly relieved, as were B Company in the Tunnel Headquarters, and the other companies.

We moved out in drizzling rain to bivouac for the night, making the best we could of the little shelter that was available. The next day, which was October 3rd, the weather took a decided turn for the better. It was a typical autumn day. After breakfasting, we took tally of our numbers and discovered that for the last two days our casualties had been remarkably few, but though the final casualty list was light, unfortunately several of our comrades died later from the result of wounds and sickness.

We eventually set out for Driencourt, where a hot meal awaited our arrival. There was no lack of accommodation in tin shelters and dugouts. Resting there for one day, we departed on the morning of October 5th. The weather was particularly fine as we marched along to Aizecourt-le-Haut, whence we were taken by light railway to Peronne. Here we changed into a train which took us back over the territory we had so recently captured; past many well-remembered places, to which the civilians were gradually returning; past war-scarred Villers-Bretonneux, thence on to Amiens, that picturesque and important town which was saved by the Third Division from falling into the hands of the enemy. At 7 o'clock that night the train drew into the station at Arraines. From here we marched ten kilometres to the pleasant little village of Vergies, and at one hour before midnight, were all snugly billeted. In less time than it takes to tell, we were tucked up in our blankets, sleeping the most peaceful sleep we had known for many a month.

Our travelling cookers and mess-cart arrived next day, having travelled by transport train.

OUR FIGHTING DAYS ARE OVER

Although the Armistice was not signed until about six weeks later, our work as a fighting unit of the Australian Imperial Forces had ended. At this juncture, however, we were not aware of that fact, but what we were quite certain of, beyond the shadow of a doubt, was that the Imperial High Command continued as determined and relentless as ever to accomplish something we had defied the enemy to do, namely, smash the 42nd Battalion.

THE THIRD ATTEMPT TO BREAK UP THE FORTY-SECOND

On October 10th, the Battalion paraded and, according to expectations, we were again addressed by our Commanding Officer.

He once more emphasised the necessity for the disbandment of the Battalion and urged the men to gravely consider the result of their actions and advised them to obey orders.

There were some few men who had expressed a desire to be transferred to other units, and these stepped aside when their names were called. The remainder stood firm, and when the command to "March" was given there was not a movement from one of them.

After this third resistance on our part, ceremonial parades, route marches, and general training occupied our days, excepting on the Sunday, when we attended a Church parade.

And so the fate of the Battalion still hung in the balance.

THE FOURTH, and FINAL EFFORT to EXTINGUISH THE BATTALION

The final effort to break up the Battalion was made on October 14th, on which occasion, when we paraded, our Commanding Officer was accompanied by Staff-officers from the 3rd Divisional Headquarters and the 11th Brigade, and these officers included the General Officer Commanding the Division, General Gellibrand.

The men were cautioned against disobedience to orders. One of the senior officers then read "The Riot Act," after which the order to "March" was given. And again, not one man moved. All officers then left the parade ground. We were taken for a route march, and upon our return it was discovered that our Cookers had been taken away.

We were informed that the 42nd no longer existed, and that henceforward we were to he designated "The 11th Brigade Training Battalion." But the pathetic struggle to "stick together" continued. A more subtle plan was therefore devised to expedite the dismemberment. During the next few days many N.C.O.'s and other aspirants for promotion were drafted to training schools. Any man complaining of the slightest ailment was forthwith sent to hospital, whilst leave to Paris or England, was freely granted.

By such means were the ranks of the 42^nd so depleted that whatever resistance might have been offered, could be but feeble.

Upon our arrival at Vergies the strength of the Battalion was 35 officers and 500 other ranks. All that now remained was but 273 all told. This remnant, along with the Brass and Pipe Bands, was transferred, intact, to the 41st Battalion, and hence onwards, until demobilisation, was known as "B Company of the 41st."

Thus, we were still a distinct body. A unit, within a unit, with which it never merged.

And so was sacrificed the 42nd Battalion.

From the ashes of that sacrifice arose the unmistakable signs of its un-quellable spirit.

It is with feelings of deepest pride that we leave to posterity the traditions of our Glorious Battalion, the annals of its devotion to duty and its sacrifices, but above all, we bequeath the Inspiration of its Spirit. The Spirit which encouraged us in the hours of danger and hardship; the Spirit which united its members in harmony and mutual trust, and which twenty years later, proudly survives, and will, we venture to predict, endure so long as there be but two 42nd men left to stick together

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